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Abstract 
This paper examines the presence of a political cycle in Australian daily stock returns over the forty-seven years 
from 6 January 1958 to 30 December 2005. The period selected includes nineteen federal elections, twenty-five 
ministries and five terms of Liberal-National or Labor government. The political cycle is defined in terms of the 
party in power, the time since the last election and election information effects. The market variables are defined 
in terms of nominal and real returns and nominal and real return volatility. The results indicate returns are 
highest during the ministries of Holt-McEwen and Hawke and lowest during Whitlam and Fraser, while risk is 
highest during Whitlam and Hawke and lowest during Menzies and Holt-McEwen. However, regression analysis 
shows that Liberal-National and Labor governments more generally differ in the volatility of returns where 
political cycle-sourced return volatility increases at a decreasing rate with the time in power. Such risk 
differences potentially arise from the different parties’ economic and social policies, uncertainty among investors 
about these policies, or doubt among voters concerning future election outcomes. 
JEL classification: G14; C12 
Keywords: presidential puzzle; political cycle; risk and return; election surprises 
1  Introduction 
Anecdotal evidence abounds of the link between securities markets and politics. In the 
financial media, most economic and social policy is analysed concerning possible market 
reactions, and industry and consumer groups comment on anticipated and hoped for changes 
in policy. At election time, politicians are frequently accused of pork-barrelling, with firms 
and investors alike anticipating the heady mix of tax breaks, consumption and production 
subsidies and fiscal and monetary stimulation that accompanies changes in the political party 
in power. At the same time, parties are routinely pigeon-holed as pro- or anti-business and 
pro- or anti-investor, reflected in some way in the flow and source of political donations. 
At least three empirical questions arise from such observations. First, does market 
behaviour differ when governments are drawn from different political parties? That is, is 
stated ideology reflected in actual policy, and does this systematically vary in its influence on 
market participants. Second, is this political influence constant or changing with the ebb and 
flow of mandated terms in office and efforts to secure re-election?  Put differently, is ideology 
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or any form implemented in a different way in business and investor policy at the beginning 
of terms of an office that at the end? Finally, if the differences in markets are taken as given, 
do markets react suddenly with the announcement of elections results, or are expectations 
developed more gradually with the benefit of political comment and opinion polls?  
The purpose of this paper is to add to this intriguing body of work the results of an analysis 
of the Australian federal political cycle and its impact on the Australian equity market. To the 
author’s knowledge this is the first work of its kind in Australia. The paper itself is divided 
into five main areas. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a 
snapshot of recent Australian political history. Section 4 explains the empirical methodology 
and data collection employed in the analysis. Section 5 presents the results. The paper ends 
with a brief conclusion. 
2.  Literature review 
The analysis of political cycles in stock market returns has been almost exclusively 
conducted in the United States, and therein the context of presidential elections. Part is 
generic, to the extent that institutional rigidities in the political cycle – mandated terms in 
office for example – impose structure upon market returns. Herbst and Slinkman (1984), for 
example, examined the period from 1926 to 1977 and found a 48-month cycle during which 
returns were higher than average, peaking in November during presidential elections. 
Likewise, Huang (1985) used data from 1832 to 1979 and discovered that stock returns were 
systematically higher in the last half of a political term than in the first, as did Hensel and 
Ziemba (1995), though with small and large-caps only. On this basis, Hensel and Ziemba 
(1995) suggested that “…these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that political re-
election campaigns create policies that stimulate the economy and are positive for stock 
returns”. 
But the larger part of this research focuses on differences in political ideology and the 
differential impact of the political cycle on stock returns. Herein the focus of interest is on the 
apparent preference of the market for right-of-centre presidents (i.e. Republicans). 
Niederhoffer et al. (1970), for instance, showed that US stock market movements around 
election dates were consistent with a pro-Republican bias on Wall Street, though evidence 
was not forthcoming on any longer-term relationship between Republican presidents and 
stock returns. Similarly, Riley and Luksetich (1980) concluded that the market prefers 
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Republicans, and the market tends to rise following presidential elections. Dobson and 
Dufrene (1993) extended this analysis outside of the United States, concluding that in equity 
market terms US presidential elections invoke significant structural changes, with 
international markets becoming more highly correlated. Other studies concerning the posited 
positive market effect of Republican presidencies have been undertaken by Allvine and 
O’Neil (1980), Hobbs and Riley (1984), Foerster and Schmitz (1997), Johnson and 
Chittenden (1999), Booth and Booth (2003) and Bohl and Gottschalk (2005), while Nordhaus 
(1975), MacCrae (1977), McCallum (1978), Hibbs (1977), Beck (1982a; 1982b), Havrilesky 
(1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Haynes (1989) address business cycles more broadly.  
Most recently, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) have re-examined the ‘presidential 
puzzle’ sometimes arising in this research: that is, real returns are higher under Democratic 
presidents, contradicting the conventional wisdom that Republicans are good for markets in a 
manner unexplained by considerations of risk. Using data since 1927, Santa-Clara and 
Valkanov (2003) found average excess returns for value-weighted market indexes over three-
month Treasury bills of about 2 percent under Republicans and 11 percent under Democrats. 
Further, a decomposition of returns revealed that the difference was due to real market returns 
being 5 percent higher under Democrats and real interest rates almost 4 percent lower. 
Responding to the question of whether the difference in average returns was due to a 
difference in expected (a Democratic risk premium) or unexpected (surprises in the economic 
policies of the party in the presidency) returns, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) concluded 
that presidential parties capture variations in returns that are largely uncorrelated to what is 
explained by business cycle fluctuations, and hence must be associated with systematic 
differences in political policies.   
       Outside of the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand are the only 
other national contexts known for the analysis of political cycles in stock returns. These are 
interesting in that while these have a two-party system in common with the United States 
(Labour and Conservative (Tory), Labour and Nationals, respectively), unlike the United 
States, the prime minister (leader of the Executive) is always controls the dominant party in 
the elected house (House of Commons, House of Representatives). For this reason, and as in 
Australia, there is a clearer connection between the political ideology of the elected party and 
the implementation of economic policy. In New Zealand, Cahan et al. (2005) concluded that 
the presidential puzzle was reversed, and that New Zealand market returns were lower under 
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left-leaning Labour governments than under National party governments. This lay at odds 
with parallel analysis that suggested that market risk was actually higher under the former.  
In the United Kingdom, Manning (1989) showed that British Telecom shares, though not 
the market as a whole, reacted to opinion polls surrounding the 1987 General Election in the 
face of impending nationalisation, while Peel and Pope (1983), Gwilym and Buckle (1984) 
and Thompson and Ioannidis (1987) examined the connection between the stock market and 
business support for Tory (Conservative) governments. But most recently, Hudson et al. 
(1998) found that while short-term price movements reacted to opinion polls in the run-up to 
and including elections, there was no statistically significant evidence of a difference in 
nominal or real returns between Tory and Labour governments.      
3. Recent Australian political history 
Two groups dominate the Australian political spectrum at the federal level. The first is a 
conservative coalition of parties made up of the Liberal Party and the Nationals (including the 
Country Liberal Party). Collectively, these are known as the Coalition. The second comprises 
a single social democratic party, the Australian Labor Party. There have been fifty-nine 
ministries since Federation in 1901, with the Coalition and its antecedents accounting for 
thirty-eight (64 percent) and the Labor Party twenty-one (36 percent). 
Originally formed by the merger of the Protectionist and Free Trade parties in 1910, the 
Liberal Party has undergone several reformations – including as the Nationalist Party in the 
late 1910s and 1920s and the United Australian Party in the 1930s and early 1940s – 
culminating in its present-day incarnation founded by Sir Robert Menzies in 1944. The 
Liberal Party is regarded as a centre-right party and broadly represents the interests of 
business, the suburban middle classes and urbanised regions. Since the October 2004 election, 
the Liberals account for seventy-four of the one hundred and fifty House of Representatives 
seats (47 percent), and from July 2005, thirty-two of the seventy-six seats in the Senate (42 
percent).  
The Nationals are a conservative party that traditionally represent rural and regional 
interests. Originally known as the Country Party, it has held seats in the federal parliament 
since 1919. While the party has witnessed the steady erosion of its rural support base in recent 
years, it still holds the balance of power for the Coalition with twelve seats in the House of 
Representatives (16 percent) and six in the Senate (8 percent). It is joined by the Country 
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Liberal Party, which is the representative of both parties in the Northern Territory, holding a 
single seat in both House of Representatives and the Senate.  
The opposing party active at the federal level is the Australian Labor Party, a centre-left 
party founded by the trade union movement in 1890 [by providing for the direct affiliation of 
trade unions, the Australian Labor Party is most like labour parties in the UK and New 
Zealand, and less like progressive parties such as the Democrats in the United States (ALP 
2006)]. Historically, support for either the Coalition or the Labor Party was viewed as class 
based, with the middle class supporting the Coalition and the working class supporting Labor. 
In recent years, this has been a less important factor: in the 1970s and 1980s Labor gained a 
significant bloc of middle class support and the Coalition enjoyed some working class 
support. Indeed, part of the current electoral success of the Coalition is attributed to its appeal 
to disaffected working class Labor voters. The Labor Party has endured a number of 
debilitating splits in its long history, most notably with Prime Minister Billy Hughes and the 
conscription debate during WWI leading to the creation of Nationalist Labor in 1917, and the 
formation of the anti-communist Democratic Labor Party in 1955. It currently accounts for 
sixty seats in the House of Representatives (40 percent) and twenty-eight in the Senate (37 
percent).  
Parties other than these have enjoyed limited success in Australia. These currently include 
the Australian Greens, a left-wing environmental party, and the Australian Democrats, 
middle-class centrists – both with four seats in the Senate – and Family First, a Christian-
influenced party appealing to social conservatives with one Senate seat. In the past, the minor 
parties have also included the centrist Democratic Labor Party from the mid-1950s until the 
mid-1970s and the rightist One Nation party during the 1990s. The proportional 
representation system often allows minor parties to win seats in the Senate and, on occasion, 
the balance of power, but they have usually been unable to win seats in the House of 
Representatives given its electorate-based preferential voting system, along with the 
nationwide dominance and broad based appeal of the Coalition and Labor parties. 
4. Research method and data 
Table 1 provides details of the nineteen federal elections held since 6 January 1958. All 
information is drawn from the Australian Electoral Commission (2006a; 2006b). Five distinct 
political periods are noted, with the Coalition in power from 1958 to 1972 (five prime 
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ministers and five winning elections), 1975 to 1983 (one prime minister and three elections) 
and 1996 to 2005 (one prime minister and four elections) and the Labor Party in power from 
1972 to 1974 (one prime minister and two winning elections) and again from 1983 to 1996 
(two prime ministers and five elections). This information is used to define the political cycle 
variables in this analysis. The first political variable specified in this analysis is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one on days the Coalition is in power and zero otherwise (Ct) 
while the second takes a value of one if the Labor Party is in power and zero otherwise (Lt).  
Within this broad division, different samples are defined representing the twenty-five 
prime ministerial terms. In most cases, the starting and ending dates for these terms are 
defined by two of the nineteen elections during the period (with allowance for a transition 
period of a few days) with the following exceptions: Menzies was re-elected out-of-sample in 
1955 and resigned in 1966, replaced by Holt; Holt disappeared while swimming, presumed 
dead, in 1967 and replaced by McEwen; Gorton was overturned in a party room vote in 1971 
and replaced by McMahon; Whitlam was sacked by Governor-General Sir John Kerr in 1975 
with Fraser taking a caretaker role until an election was held one month later; Hawke was 
overturned by Keating in a party room vote in 1991; and Howard is the currently serving 
prime minister. The separate prime ministerial terms are then aggregated by prime minister 
with Menzies, Hawke and Howard serving four terms; Holt, Gorton, Whitlam and Keating 
two terms; and McEwen and McMahon one term. Because McEwen governed for just twenty-
three days and McMahon never successfully contested an election, they are included with 
Holt and Gorton, respectively. 
The next two political variables are included to take account of whether the return on 
equities varies across the term in office. Rather than using dummy variables to identify 
whether a day falls in, say, the first or second half of the period in office as in Hudson et al. 
(1998), a continuous variable is specified as a simple linear trend (Tt) taking a value of one on 
the first trading day in office, two on the second day, and so on. This variable is reset at the 
beginning of the next government’s term in office. The square of this variable (St) is also 
included to take account of any non-linear relationships between the political cycle and 
market returns. Two additional dummy variables are defined to take account of election 
effects on market returns. The first of these takes a value of one for each day of the trading 
week (Monday to Friday) before the election date (Saturday) (Bt), and zero otherwise, while 
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the second takes a value of one for each day of the trading week following the election (At) 
and zero otherwise.  
The market data employed in the study are closing prices from the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) over the period Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005. This 
sample encompasses 12,067 trading days and represents the longest period for which daily 
data is available. The capitalization-weighted All Ordinaries Price Index is used. The index 
includes the top ASX-listed stocks by capitalization, covering about 92 percent of domestic 
companies by market value. To be included in the index, stocks must have an aggregate 
market value of at least 0.02 percent of all domestic equities, and maintain an average 
turnover in excess of 0.5 percent of quoted shares each month. The long-term index includes 
base recalculations by Global Financial Data (2006).  
A series of daily nominal returns are calculated where ( )1ln100 −= ttnt PPR  where Pt is the 
index level on day t. The daily real return is also calculated ( )tttrt iPPR .ln100 1−=  where it is 
the daily rate of increase in the consumer price index as defined by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics’ (2006) retail/consumer price index (1945 = 100) and all other variables are as 
previously defined. Finally, a simple measure of the daily volatility of both the nominal and 
real return series is calculated using the standard deviation of rolling one-month period 
returns. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) suggest that differences in risk may arise across 
presidential terms (Democrats and Republicans) because of differences in economic policies, 
or from varying levels of uncertainty among investors about these policies. In this manner, 
“…it would be reasonable to argue that it [higher realised returns] should command a risk 
premium to compensate investors for the greater risks incurred in those periods” (Santa-Clara 
and Valkanov 2003: 1867).  The method used in this analysis to calculate volatility is 
identical to Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003). As an alternative, Cahan et al. (2005) estimated 
return volatility with the absolute value of returns. 
Two approaches are used to test the political cycle hypotheses. The first involves a 
descriptive analysis of the mean daily returns and tests of equality of means using parametric 
analysis. As a rule, the mean return for Coalition governments is expected to be higher than 
the mean return for Labor governments. Further, it is hypothesised that returns one week 
before and after elections may be higher or lower than returns during the same political term, 
but the direction may be dependent upon whether the election comprises a shock. Santa-Clara 
and Valkanov (2003: 1863), for example, argued that “…if the observed difference in returns 
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is due to a difference in expected returns, the change in the level of the market at the time that 
the information is revealed should be quite large”. 
The second approach used is a regression-based approach where the 12,067 daily nominal 
and real returns are regressed separately against the political cycle variables: 
tttttttt ABSTLCR εββββββ ++++++= 654321      (1) 
where Rt is the nominal or real Monday to Friday market return at time t, Ct is a dummy 
variable that equals one for a Coalition government and zero otherwise, Lt is a dummy 
variable that equals one for a Labor government and zero otherwise, Tt and St are political 
cycle time trends, Bt and At are election effects, βi are coefficients to be estimated and ε is the 
error term. Following the hypotheses presented, the sign on the coefficient for Ct is expected 
to be positive and larger in magnitude than Lt, the sign on Tt is expected to be negative. The 
hypothesised sign of St may be positive or negative, depending upon whether the political 
cycle trend in returns and volatility increases at an increasing or decreasing rate. Two 
additional regressions are also specified for risk where:  
tttttttt ABSTLCV εββββββ ++++++= 654321      (2) 
where Vt is the nominal or real return volatility and all other variables are as previously 
defined. The first null hypothesis tested is: 
0: 6543210 ====== ββββββH  (3) 
against the alternative that at least some 0≠β . The second null hypothesis tested is: 
210 : ββ =H  (4) 
against the alternative 211 : ββ ≠H . If the first null hypothesis is rejected, then the market 
returns and/or risk exhibit a form of political cycle, related to either the party in power and/or 
the tenure of power and/or election effects. If the second is rejected, then the parties have a 
differential impact upon market returns and/or risk.  
5.  Empirical results 
The daily market returns and return volatility are plotted in Figure 1. Table 2 presents the 
summary of descriptive statistics for the daily nominal and real returns. These are categorised 
according to the separate ministries over the sample period: namely, Menzies, Holt-McEwen, 
Gorton-McMahon, Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke, Keating and Howard. Liberal-National refers to 
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the combined Menzies, Holt-McEwen, Gorton-McMahon, Fraser and Howard governments. 
As shown in Table 2, mean nominal returns are highest during Holt-McEwen (0.0651) and 
Hawke (0.0509) and lowest during (Whitlam (-0.0556) and Menzies (0.0245), while real 
returns are highest during Holt-McEwen (0.0562) and Hawke (0.0323) and lowest during 
Whitlam (-0.0889) and Fraser (0.0066). The nominal and real volatility of returns (as 
measured by standard deviation) is highest during Whitlam (1.1632 to 1.1629) and Hawke 
(1.1376 to 1.1375) and lowest during Menzies (0.4553 to 0.4556) and Holt-McEwen (0.5308 
to 0.5307).  
By and large, the distributional properties of the nominal returns series during these 
ministries appear non-normal. Given that the sampling distribution of skewness is normal 
with mean 0 and standard deviation of T6  where T is the sample size, then returns during 
Menzies (-1.320), Gorton-McMahon (-0.145), Hawke (-7.994) and Howard (-0.680) are 
significantly negatively skewed, indicating the greater likelihood of observations lying below 
the mean, while returns during Holt-McEwen (0.240), Whitlam (0.257) and Fraser (0.322) are 
significantly positively skewed. The kurtosis or degree of excess across all returns is mostly 
large, indicating leptokurtic distributions with many extreme observations: Menzies (19.506), 
Holt-McEwen (5.402), Gorton-McMahon (4.519), Whitlam (7.035), Fraser (4.973), Hawke 
(190.08) and Howard (8.278). Kurtosis during Keating (0.597) is less than three, indicating a 
platykurtic or thin-tailed distribution with few extreme observations. Given the sampling 
distribution of kurtosis is normal with mean 0 and standard deviation of T24  where T is 
the sample size, then all estimates are once again statistically significant at any conventional 
level.  
Figure 2 graphs the annualised nominal return for each of the twenty-five prime ministerial 
terms since 1958. Clearly, there is again much variation in the annual returns experienced 
under the various prime ministers, ranging between -11 percent for Whitlam II and +53 
percent for McEwen (albeit with a very short sample period). Augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Peron tests (with allowance for autocorrelation) (not shown) for the nominal and real 
return and nominal and real return volatility series all reject the null hypothesises of a unit 
root at the .01 level and we conclude that the return series are stationary and suitable for 
regression-based analysis. 
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5.1 Parametric tests of mean return differences 
At first impression, there appears to be some evidence of a political cycle effect in the 
Australian stock market. Certainly, returns appear to vary across the various prime ministries, 
whether aggregated by prime minister (Table 2) or by individual ministry (Figure 2). Returns 
and risk also appear to differ by political affiliation. As shown in Table 2, the mean daily 
nominal (real) return for Liberal-National governments is 0.0307 (0.0187) compared to 
0.0269 (0.0089) for Labor governments. Risk appears higher during Labor governments with 
a nominal (real) standard deviation of returns of 1.0542 (1.0543) for Labor governments 
compared to 0.7115 (0.7117) for Liberal-national governments. However, while Levene’s test 
of equality of variances is rejected for nominal (statistic = 225.293, p-value = 0.0000) and real 
(statistic = 224.293, p-value = 0.0000) returns, indicating unequal risk, it fails to be reject the 
null hypothesis of the equality of means (columns 8 and 9 in Table 2) assuming unequal 
variances. This indicates that risk (standard deviation) is significantly higher for Labor 
governments in Australia, but there is no significant difference in returns between Liberal-
National and Labor governments in the last forty-seven years. However, returns are 
significantly lower during the (Labor) prime ministry of Whitlam (1972-1975).  
Table 2 also presents the means and tests of equality of means for the trading week before 
and after the election during each ministry. The purpose is to test for the presence of an 
election effect. However, only during Keating are returns (both nominal and real) 
significantly higher in the week before the election (columns 12 and 13) and only during 
Whitlam are returns significantly lower in the week following an election (columns 16 and 
17). The latter appears consistent with the (negative) information effects associated with 
Whitlam outside of the immediate election period. With the former, Keating contested just 
two elections: the first (winning) election in 1993 (“the sweetest victory of all”), was a 
surprise with a Coalition victory widely predicted; the second (losing) election was associated 
with the highest Liberal-National two-party preferred vote since 1977. In both cases, there 
was a general perception of a change in government with the defeat of a deeply unpopular (at 
least from the business perspective) incumbent.   
5.2 Regression-based analysis of the political cycle and election effects  
The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the parameters detailed in (1) and (2) are 
presented in Table 3. Four separate regressions with four different regressands are included: 
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nominal returns and nominal return volatility, real returns and real return volatility. The 
regressors for the four regressions are common. The independent variables are dummy 
variables for Liberal-National and Labor governments, a political term trend and its square, 
and dummy variables for the week before and after a federal election. Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange multiplier and White’s heteroskedasticity tests are initially used to test for higher-
order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the least squares residuals, respectively. The 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected in all cases and we may conclude the 
presence of higher-order serial correlation in the residuals. The null hypothesis of no 
heteroskedasticity in the least squares residuals is also rejected. All standard errors and p-
values in Table 3 incorporate Newey-West corrections for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form. 
Once again, the signs on the estimated coefficients initially appear to offer some support 
for the posited influence of political cycles on market returns. In terms of returns, the 
coefficient on Liberal-National is always positive and higher than Labor. However, only for 
nominal returns are the estimated coefficients both significantly different from zero; with real 
returns, only the coefficient for Liberal-National is significant. But in either case, the Wald 
tests (column 12) fail to reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients are equal. The trend 
and the trend square term and the before and after election terms offer fleeting support for a 
political cycle and election effect in that their coefficients are of the hypothesised sign, but in 
no case are they significant. That said, the null hypotheses of the joint insignificance of the 
coefficients for both return regressions are rejected (column 11) and we confirm that the 
political cycle and effect variables jointly influence mean returns.       
However, the regressions for nominal and real return volatility (risk) present quite different 
results. As before, there is no evidence of a market effect immediately before or after an 
election: the information content of elections themselves appears limited. But return volatility 
is always significantly higher for Labor governments than Liberal-National governments, by 
about a quarter of one percent on any day. This is a similar result to Cahan et al. (2005) who 
also found that market risk was higher under the left-leaning Labour government in New 
Zealand. At the same time, return volatility is seen to increase, though at a decreasing rate, 
over the time in office. The magnitude of the increase in return volatility is very small, 
however, increasing by only about one-fifth of a percent during the typical parliamentary term 
of three years. Importantly, this increase in volatility with the political term in office is 
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common to both Liberal-National and Labor governments. As before, the null hypothesis of 
the joint insignificance of the coefficients is rejected and we may conclude that the political 
cycle jointly influences return volatility (risk) in the Australian stock market.          
6. Concluding remarks 
The present study employs parametric analysis to test for a political cycle in the Australian 
stock market. A comparison of mean returns provides some empirical evidence to support the 
conjecture that returns depend upon the government in power. There is limited support for an 
election effect where returns are systematically higher or lower in the period leading up to ot 
immediately following an election. Any apparent differences are lessened when returns are 
expressed in real rather than nominal terms. Similar results are obtained with a regression-
based analysis.  
However, return volatility is significantly higher under Labor governments than Liberal-
National governments. This is problematic in that with any difference in the riskiness of the 
market across political parties, it is reasonable to argue that the market should command a risk 
premium to compensate investors for the greater risks incurred. Certainly, abundant evidence 
exists elsewhere of a positive relation between the expected risk premium and the predictable 
level of volatility. Why then do investors appear to require no such compensation under Labor 
governments in Australia?  
One possibility is that a large and persistent difference in risk unmatched in return cannot 
exist in an efficient market, but can in an inefficient one. Investors may perceive the Labor 
Party in power as a noisy signal of economic and social policy. Given the relatively small 
number of Labor ministries during the sample, investors may never really systematically 
understand the influence on stock prices. And in many cases, past experience offers little 
guidance. For example, compare the radical social non-market reforms of Whitlam with the 
pro-market deregulation and microeconomic reform undertaken during the Hawke-Keating 
period. In this general setting, stock volatility reflects diffuse and easily changed beliefs about 
future political behavior, but on balance, these views are never systematically ‘bad’ or ‘good’ 
over extended periods of time.  
Another possibility follows suggestions by Beaulieu (2005) that investors may not simply 
require a premium for domestic political risk. This suggests the presence of some form of 
diversification on the part of domestic investors or the exercise of real options by businesses. 
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For example, firms may bring forward or delay investment projects given current policies: 
only a marginal net effect on future expected cash differs. This may in be aided, in part, by the 
fact that political horizons are short and investment horizons can be long. 
References 
Alesina, A. and Sachs, J. (1988) Political parties and the business cycle in the United States, 1948-1984, Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, 20(1), 63-82. 
Allvine, P. and D. E. O’Neil, (1980) Stock market returns and the presidential election cycle, Financial Analysts 
Journal, 36, 49-56. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006) Retail/Consumer Price Index Numbers, available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/. Accessed April 2006. 
Australian Electoral Commission (2006a) Federal, State and Territory Election Dates 1946–Present, available at 
http://www.aec.gov.au/. Accessed April 2006.   
Australian Electoral Commission (2006b) Electoral Pocketbook 2005, available at http://www.aec.gov.au/. 
Accessed April 2006. 
Australian Labor Party (2006) http://www.alp.org.au/. Accessed April 2006. 
Beaulieu, M.C. Cosset, J.C. Essaddam, N. (2005) The impact of political risk on the volatility of stock returns: 
The case of Canada, Journal of International Business Studies, 36(6), 701-18. 
Beck, N. (1982a) Domestic political sources of American monetary policy: 1955-82, Journal of Politics, 46, 
786-817. 
Beck, N. (1982b) Parties, administrations and American macroeconomic outcomes, American Political Science 
Review, 26, 83-94. 
Bohl, M.T. and Gottschalk, K. (2005) International evidence on the Democratic premium  and presidential cycle 
effect, Paper presented at the 8th Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, 8 April, 
Zurich. 
Booth, J.R. and Booth, L.C. (2003) Is the presidential cycle in security returns merely a reflection of business 
conditions? Review of Financial Economics, 12(1), 131-159.  
Cahan, J. Malone, C.B. Powell, J.G. and Choti, U.W. (2005) Stock market political cycles in a small, two-party 
democracy, Applied Economics Letters, 12, 735–740. 
Dobson, J. and Dufrene, U. B. (1993) The impacts of U.S. presidential elections on international security-
markets, Global Finance Journal, 4(1), 39-47. 
Foerster, S. R. and Schmitz, J. J. (1997) The transmission of US election cycles to international stock returns, 
Journal of International Business, 28, 1–27. 
Global Financial Data (2006) http://www.globfindata.com, Accessed February 2006. 
Gwilym, O. A. P. and Buckle, M. (1994) The efficiency of stock and options markets: Tests based on 1992 UK 
election opinion polls, Applied Financial Economics, 4, 345-54. 
Havrilesky, T. (1987) A partisanship theory of fiscal and monetary regimes, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 19, 308-25. 
Haynes, S. E. and Stone, J. A. (1989) An integrated test for electoral cycles in the US economy, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 71, 426-34. 
Hebst, A.F. and Slinkman, C.W. (1984) Political-economic cycles in the US stock market, Financial Analysts 
Journal, 40(2), 38-44. 
Hensel,C.R. and Ziemba, W.T. (1995) United States investment returns during Democratic and Republican 
Administrations, 1928-1993, Financial Analysts Journal, 51(2), 61-69. 
Hibbs, D. A., (1977) Political parties and macroeconomic policy, American Political Science Review, 71, 1467-
87. 
Hobbs, G.R. and Riley, W.B. (1984) Profiting from a presidential election, Financial Analysts Journal, 40(2). 
46-52. 
Huang, R.D. (1985) Common stock returns and presidential elections, Financial Analysts Journal, 41(2), 58-65. 
 
 
14 
Hudson, R. Keasey, K. and Dempsey, M. (1998) Share prices under Tory and Labour governments in the UK 
since 1945, Applied Financial Economics, 8, 389-400. 
Johnson, R. R., and Chittenden, W. (1999) Presidential politics, stocks, bonds, bills, and inflation, Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 26, 27–31. 
MacRae, D., (1977) A political model of the business cycle, Journal of Political Economy, 85, 239-63. 
Manning, D. N. (1989) The effect of political uncertainty on the stock market: The case of British Telecom, 
Applied Economics, 21, 881-9. 
McCallum, B. (1978) The political business cycle: An empirical test, Southern Journal of Economics, 44, 504-
15. 
Niederhoffer, V., Gibbs, S. and Bullock, J. (1970) Presidential elections and the stock market, Financial 
Analysts Journal, Mar/Apr, 111-13. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975) The political business cycle, Review of Economic Studies, 42, 169-90. 
Peel, D. A. and Pope, P. F. (1983) General elections in the U.K. in the post 1950 period and the behaviour of the 
stock market, Investment Analyst, 67, 4-10. 
Riley, W. B. and Luksetich W. A. (1980) The market prefers Republicans: Myth or reality, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 15(3), 541-560. 
Santa-Clara, P. and Valkanov, R. (2003) The presidential puzzle: Political cycles and the stock market, Journal 
of Finance, 58(5), 1841-1872 
Thompson, R. S. and Ioannidis, C. (1987) The stock market response to voter opinion polls, Investment Analyst, 
83, 19-22. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Australian federal elections, governments, prime ministers and leaders of the opposition, 1958-2005 
Election  
date Turnout Vote 
Elected  
party or coalition Prime Minister 
Start of  
term 
End of  
term 
Opposition  
party 
Opposition  
leader  
Start of  
term 
End of  
term 
22 Nov 1958 95.44 54.10  Evatt, Herbert  20 Jun 1951 9 Feb 1960 
9 Dec 1961 95.22 49.50 
30 Nov 1963 95.71 52.60 
 Menzies, Robert  
  
19 Dec 1949 26 Jan 1966 
 
 Holt, Harold  26 Jan 1966 19 Dec 1967 26 Nov 1966 95.13 56.90 
 McEwen, John  19 Dec 1967 10 Jan 1968 
 Calwell, Arthur 7 Mar 1960 8 Feb 1967 
 Gorton, John  10 Jan 1968 10 Mar 1971 25 Oct 1969 94.96 49.80 
Liberal–Country    
Party   
 McMahon, William 10 Mar 1971 5 Dec 1972 
Australian Labor 
Party   
 Whitlam, Gough  8 Feb 1967 5 Dec 1972 
2 Dec 1972 95.38 47.30  Snedden, William 20 Dec 1972 21 Mar 1975 
18 May 1974 95.40 48.30 
Australian Labor    
Party    Whitlam, Gough 5 Dec 1972 11 Nov 1975 
Liberal–Country 
Party    Fraser, Malcolm  21 Mar 1975 11 Nov 1975 
13 Dec 1975 95.40 55.70 
10 Dec 1977 95.08 54.60 
 Whitlam, Gough  27 Jan 1976 22 Dec 1977 
 Hayden, William  22 Dec 1977 3 Feb 1983 18 Oct 1980 94.35 50.40 
Liberal–Country    
Party    Fraser, Malcolm  11 Nov 1975 11 Mar 1983 
Australian Labor 
Party   
 Hawke, Robert 3 Feb 1983 11 Mar 1983 
5 Mar 1983 94.64 46.77 
1 Dec 1984 94.17 48.23 
 Peacock, Andrew 11 Mar 1983 5 Sep 1985 
11 Jul 1987 93.84 49.17  Howard, John 5 Sep 1985 9 May 1989 
24 Mar 1990 95.32 50.10 
 Hawke, Robert  11 Mar 1983 20 Dec 1991 
 Peacock, Andrew 9 May 1989 3 Apr 1990 
 Hewson, John 3 Apr 1990 23 May 1994 
 Downer, Alexander 23 May 1994 30 Jan 1995 13 Mar 1993 95.75 48.56 
Australian Labor    
Party   
 Keating, Paul  20 Dec 1991 11 Mar 1996 
Liberal–Country 
Party   
 Howard, John 30 Jan 1995 11 Mar 1996 
2 Mar 1996 95.77 53.63 
3 Oct 1998 94.99 49.02 
 Beazley, Kim  19 Mar 1996 22 Nov 2001 
10 Nov 2001 94.85 50.95 
Liberal–National  
Party of Australia  
 Crean, Simon  22 Nov 2001 2 Dec 2003 
 Latham, Mark  2 Dec 2003 18 Jan 2005 9 Oct 2004 94.32 52.74 Liberal–Nationals  
 Howard, John  11 Mar 1996 – Australian Labor Party   
 Beazley, Kim  28 Jan 2005 – 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission (2006a; 2006b). Notes: The Australian Parliament consists of two houses, the Senate – selected by voters within a state - 
and the House of Representatives – selected by voters within an electorate. The party or coalition of parties that has a majority in the House of Representatives (of 
which the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition are normally part) forms the Government. Voting is compulsory with elections always held on a Saturday. 
The maximum length until a House of Representatives election is held is three years from the first sitting day of the current Parliament plus up to sixty-eight days 
of adjustments for the issuance of writs, close of nominations, etc. Senators are elected for six year terms on a rotating basis with half of the Senators retiring every 
three years. If there is a ‘double dissolution’ all Senators and Members of the House of Representatives face election as in 1973, 1975, 1983 and 1987. Vote is the 
two-party preferred vote for the Liberal-Country/National Party coalition. The Country Party changed its name to the National Country Party in the 1970s, then to 
National Party in the 1980s, and finally to The Nationals in 2003. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Daily nominal returns and return volatility 
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Notes: Sample period Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005. Figures show daily returns (left-
hand side axis) and daily return volatility (right-hand side axis). Volatility is measured as the rolling one-month 
standard deviation of returns.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Annual nominal returns by prime ministerial term 
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Notes: Figure shows the annualised nominal return using daily data for each prime ministerial term from 1958 to 2005. Australian 
Labor Party governments are indicated with a darker shade. The number of prime ministerial terms shown (25) exceeds the number 
of parliamentary terms as distinguished by elections (21) because of replacement of the prime minister during office: Menzies 
resigned in 1966 and was replaced by Holt, Holt went missing, presumed dead in 1967 and was replaced by McEwen, Gorton was 
overturned in a party room vote in 1971 and was replaced by McMahon, Hawke was overturned in a party room vote in 1991 and 
was replaced by Keating.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Comparison of daily returns by government and before and after elections, Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005 
 
Government In-government  returns 
Out-of-government  
returns  
Tests of equality 
of means 
Returns and tests of equality of means 
one week before election 
Returns and tests of equality of means 
one week after election 
   Days Mean Std. dev Days Mean Std. dev t-statistic p-value Mean Std. dev t-statistic p-value Mean Std. dev t-statistic p-value 
Menzies 2003 0.0245 0.4553 10064 0.0305 0.8986 0.4422 0.6584 0.1103 0.3501 -0.7331 0.4636 0.0199 0.4954 0.0387 0.9691 
Holt-McEwen 488 0.0651 0.5308 11579 0.0280 0.8519 -1.4674 0.1428 0.0019 0.2009 0.2672 0.7894 0.2024 0.1683 -0.5811 0.5614 
Gorton-McMahon 1231 0.0247 0.8284 10836 0.0300 0.8428 0.2143 0.8304 -0.1146 0.8176 0.5337 0.5936 -0.1146 0.8176 0.5337 0.5936 
Whitlam 733 -0.0556 1.1632 11334 0.0350 0.8159 2.0763 0.0382 -0.1349 0.4471 0.1528 0.8786 -0.8886 1.5077 2.1670 0.0306 
Fraser 1846 0.0342 0.8198 10221 0.0286 0.8452 -0.2700 0.7872 0.2702 1.1465 -0.9513 0.3527 0.2040 1.8738 -0.3986 0.6948 
Hawke 2220 0.0509 1.1376 9847 0.0246 0.7587 -1.0353 0.3006 0.0396 0.9432 0.0383 0.9695 -0.0821 0.7606 0.4692 0.6390 
Keating 1068 0.0337 0.7495 10999 0.0290 0.8498 -0.1742 0.8617 0.5058 0.5014 -2.0038 0.0453 -0.1048 1.1753 0.3755 0.7159 
Howard 2478 0.0295 0.7614 9589 0.0295 0.8608 -0.0015 0.9988 0.0602 0.8359 -0.1569 0.8754 0.0272 0.8748 0.0115 0.9908 
N
om
in
al
  r
et
ur
ns
 
Liberal-National 8046 0.0307 0.7115 4021 0.0269 1.0542 -0.2088 0.8346 0.1075 0.8330 -0.7268 0.4700 0.1165 1.1526 -0.5647 0.5744 
Menzies 2003 0.0191 0.4556 10064 0.0148 0.8987 -0.3166 0.7516 0.1058 0.3503 -0.7404 0.4592 0.0154 0.4964 0.0311 0.9752 
Holt-McEwen 488 0.0562 0.5307 11579 0.0138 0.8520 -1.6773 0.0940 -0.0061 0.2010 0.2637 0.7921 0.1944 0.1683 -0.5848 0.5590 
Gorton-McMahon 1231 0.0133 0.8285 10836 0.0157 0.8430 0.0955 0.9240 -0.1268 0.8182 0.5369 0.5915 -0.1268 0.8182 0.5369 0.5915 
Whitlam 733 -0.0889 1.1629 11334 0.0222 0.8159 2.5465 0.0111 -0.1734 0.4471 0.1629 0.8707 -0.9170 1.5170 2.1550 0.0315 
Fraser 1846 0.0066 0.8198 10221 0.0171 0.8453 0.5034 0.6147 0.2396 1.1470 -0.9391 0.3588 0.1729 1.8748 -0.3904 0.7008 
Hawke 2220 0.0323 1.1375 9847 0.0117 0.7590 -0.8158 0.4147 0.0222 0.9403 0.0347 0.9723 -0.1001 0.7571 0.4675 0.6402 
Keating 1068 0.0274 0.7494 10999 0.0143 0.8499 -0.4844 0.6281 0.4998 0.5016 -2.0057 0.0451 -0.1108 1.1756 0.3744 0.7167 
Howard 2478 0.0229 0.7615 9589 0.0136 0.8609 -0.4913 0.6232 0.0535 0.8349 -0.1562 0.8759 0.0205 0.8738 0.0121 0.9903 
R
ea
l r
et
ur
ns
 
Liberal-National 8046 0.0187 0.7117 4021 0.0089 1.0543 -0.5335 0.5937 0.0928 0.8319 -0.7527 0.4543 0.1023 1.1524 -0.5800 0.5641 
Notes: Sample period Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005. Days refers to the number of trading days; means before (after) election are daily returns for the week 
before (after) the Saturday election. Levene’s test of equality of variances determines whether the test for equality of means assumes equal or unequal variances. Tests of equality of 
means one week before and after election are against all other days during that government. Mc-Ewen is included with Holt, McMahon is included with Gorton. Howard remains in 
government at the end of the sample period. Liberal-National refers to the Menzies, Holt-McEwen, Gorton-McMahon, Fraser and Howard governments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3  
Estimated coefficients and standard errors of political cycle models  
Dependent 
variable Variable 
Liberal-
National Labor Trend 
Trend 
squared 
Before 
election 
After 
election 
Breusch-
Godfrey White 
Joint  
test 
Equality  
test 
Coefficient/statistic 0.0533 0.0477 -4.22E-05 1.32E-08 0.0970 -0.0656 1.52E+05 14.2714 2.7267 0.0582 
Standard error 0.0251 0.0272 5.44E-05 2.30E-08 0.0830 0.1283 – – – – Nominal returns 
p-value 0.0334 0.0800 0.4377 0.5649 0.2429 0.6091 0.0000 0.0000 0.0120 0.8094 
Coefficient/statistic 0.5289 0.7749 2.34E-04 -1.09E-07 0.0024 0.0570 1.52E+05 3.2056 637.7383 55.5420 
Standard error 0.0346 0.0282 7.50E-05 3.10E-08 0.0804 0.0939 – – – – 
Nominal 
return 
volatility p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0005 0.9760 0.5439 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Coefficient/statistic 0.0432 0.0316 -4.88E-05 1.66E-08 0.0954 -0.0669 1.79E+02 14.2705 1.3136 0.2431 
Standard error 0.0251 0.0272 5.43E-05 2.30E-08 0.0829 0.1288 – – – – Real returns 
p-value 0.0852 0.2464 0.3693 0.4689 0.2501 0.6035 0.0000 0.0015 0.2470 0.6220 
Coefficient/statistic 0.5288 0.7748 2.34E-04 -1.09E-07 0.0024 0.0570 1.52E+05 3.5885 637.6852 55.5350 
Standard error 0.0346 0.0282 7.50E-05 3.10E-08 0.0804 0.0939 – – – – 
Real 
return 
volatility p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0004 0.9759 0.5438 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Sample period Monday 6 January 1958 to Friday 30 December 2005. Breusch-Godfrey – Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test for ordinary least 
squares regression model, White – White heteroskedasticity test for ordinary least squares regression model. All standard errors and p-values incorporate 
Newey-West corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. Joint test – F-statistic and significance of null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero. Equality test – Wald statistic and significance of null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for Liberal-National minus Labor equals zero.  
 
